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A New Departure for Wales: Devolution and Regional Economic Development 











The process of devolution in the UK is often seen in purely political terms: reforming the UK constitutional arrangements in order to accommodate specific demands for greater self-determination, as witnessed in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. In England, devolution steps were instigated by the UK government in order to shift responsibility for regional development to regional organisations and institutions which presumably know best what is good for their region (Elcock, 2001). However, that demand for such political restructuring has arisen now is no accident, and reflects a wider set of problems which form the socio-economic background to the recent political developments. In all the intense debates about the allocation of decision-making powers and functions to the various levels of government in the UK, it was so far only in England that the economic angle has consistently been at the forefront of the debates. In other parts of the UK, notably Wales, questions related to its status as a nation, to its cultural distinctness, and to specific group interests of regional elites have frequently overshadowed if not actually blurred economic considerations. However, as numerous British and Continental examples show (e.g., Balme, 1996; Krämer, 1998, Kohler-Koch, 1998; Loughlin, 2001), it is precisely the interaction between political developments and economic and social factors which determine the success or failure of a regional development project. Not only do regions face various natural, economic, social, cultural, political and administrative conditions when embarking on a development process, there are also a number of external influences, such has EU regional policy-making and economic globalisation, whether this is welcome by regional actors or not. 
This situation suggests that regional development is a complex and multi-faceted task, comprising socio-economic, political and socio-cultural elements (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). One case in point is Wales. This article aims to contribute to the political debated on these matters by focussing on the politics of economic management at the meso level in Wales. The first part briefly discusses the evolution and contexts of recent regional political developments in Wales. This is followed by an assessment of Welsh regional development policies and funding mechanisms under the “New Labour” UK government, and the chances and constraints of successful political management under the new regime of the National Assembly for Wales (NAW). Finally, conclusions are drawn with regard to  political ways and means of regional development management in the NAW’s second legislative period, and with regard to lessons from the Welsh case for similar devolution scenarios.


The institutional and legal framework of Welsh devolution 

In recent years, the Welsh economic and political landscapes have both undergone significant changes. The traditional industries, especially coal mining and textile manufacturing, have seen severe decline, while small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in manufacturing and service industries have contributed to some recovery. Much of this development was facilitated by the EU in the form of European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and European Social Fund (ESF) provisions as well as a number of accompanying measures, e.g. Wales’ selection as a Regional Technology Plan (RTP) region (Loughlin and Mathias, 1996). Since the early 1990s, we also witnessed a massive increase in the number and the competencies of semi-public agencies (Morgan and Roberts, 1993), which has led to the massive involvement of these actors not only in public-private partnerships but also in roles which previously had been allocated to public administration – in particular spatial planning and human resource development.
On the political end, the local government reform in April 1996 brought about territorial changes and a change from a two-tier to a single-tier system of  local authorities. This also coincided with a review of  Parliamentary constituency boundaries in time for the 1997 general elections. Yet the most significant alterations to the political system were introduced after the Labour Party had won these elections. The establishment of a Labour government led by Tony Blair ended 18 years of Conservative rule under Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major, and marked a distinct watershed in virtually all policy areas in the UK, not least in regional development policy. The new government lost no time in promoting significant constitutional reforms along regionalist lines. It also brought about a more positive approach to Europe. These changes affected and stimulated the processes of regional and interregional mobilisation and co-operation that had already begun on the local and sub-regional levels.
Formally, until 1999, there was no regional government in the constituent parts of the UK. The original concept was for the Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Ireland Offices, i.e. Departments of the UK government, to represent these territories at the UK Cabinet table – and vice versa these Offices (Ministries) to represent the UK government in their respective territories. In England, the latter role was given to a number of Government Offices (Regional Administrations without the status of a Ministry) in the nine English Standard Regions. 














Compared to what used to be UK standard until quite recently, however, the powers that are granted to the NAW are still formidable. Most important among these is the right to enact secondary legislation in most spheres of regional affairs. So, while the NAW has virtually no control over how much public money is being spent Wales, it has the final say regarding the distribution of these funds. In fact, the NAW has been given the right to shape socio-economic development policies according to its own principles and choices, provided that these policies do not break EU law or unduly interfere with policies run by the UK government for the entire country, or by other regional assemblies. In addition, the NAW gained the power to set up, abolish or alter the structure and leadership composition of semi-public agencies, to directly oversee local government, and to make appointments to the regional Civil Service. Welsh representation within the governmental system of the UK, and towards the EU, however, remains the key role of the Secretary of State for Wales. 
However, this office has seen dramatic changes since 1999. Prior to devolution, The Secretary of State was the highest-ranking politician in Wales, with UK Cabinet rank, and in charge of the Welsh Office. In effect, the Secretary of State was the lead government official, head of the Civil Service in Wales and  key policy co-ordinator for most public policies in Wales.​[3]​ In 1999, the Secretary of State lost most of these roles as they were transferred to the NAW, with only external representation and some oversight over finances and local government remaining as key functions. In June 2003, Prime Minister Blair decided to downgrade the Secretary of State’s role even further. Within the framework of a wider government reorganisation exercise, the key responsibilities for all matters associated with devolution were transferred to a newly created Department of Constitutional Affairs, to replace the former Lord Chancellor’s Department – an office which had been in existence for over 1,400 years. This new Department is also responsible for conducting further devolution steps in England,​[4]​ for the reorganisation of the justice system, and for completing the on-going House of Lords reform. With this multitude of tasks at hand, however, dealing with Scotland and Wales would be very low on the agenda for the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs. Furthermore, in the 1998 devolution referenda Labour had promised that Scotland and Wales would keep their direct, individual representations in the UK Cabinet. To facilitate this, Blair decided to turn the roles of Secretary of State for Scotland and Secretary of State for Wales into part-time positions, added on to the brief of other Cabinet members.​[5]​ In the first incarnation of this new regime, effective from 13th June 2003, the Secretary of State for Transport, Alistair Darling, also took on the role of Secretary of State for Scotland. The former Secretary of State for Wales, Peter Hain, was appointed as Leader of the House of Commons​[6]​ and also kept the Welsh role. In the summer of 2003, Britain saw intense debates not only between the political parties but also among political scientists, lawyers and regional interest groups about these new arrangements, which were introduced virtually overnight and without any public consultation. While the style and speed of the introduction of these arrangements offer a rare demonstration of the considerable powers held by the Prime Minister in the UK system, at the time of writing (July 2003) virtually nobody – possibly not even the politicians directly concerned – seems to have a clear idea how these arrangements are going to operate in practice.  The new 2003-04 Parliamentary Season will certainly provide first experiences – and much room for new research  –  in this respect, but given Blair’s propensity for reform at every possible opportunity, further alterations and adjustments of government organisation and procedure are very likely.                
What we do know already, though, is that the members of the NAW and the Welsh Executive (regional ministers chosen from the members of the NAW) in effect only have limited legitimisation and similarly limited opportunities to deal with foreign and EU affairs, regulated by so-called ‘Concordats’ or Partnership Agreements between the UK government and the regional assemblies (Poirier, 2001). Nevertheless, these arrangements fall short of a permanent and legally binding arrangement that would have been available through the inclusion of these matters in the legislation establishing the NAW.​[7]​ 
The NAW has no income of its own and is not empowered to generate any income, either through taxation or through business activities. Formally, the Secretary of State for Wales, on behalf of the NAW, submits the Welsh expenditure plans to the UK Cabinet, which after consideration and consultation with the UK Treasury and the UK National Audit Commission submits the Welsh plans as part of the overall UK budget to Parliament. The standard UK public spending allocation formula, known as the ‘Barnett formula’, is still used by the Treasury and the Cabinet for calculating the spending allocation between Departments, and the NAW is here treated like a Department. However, the Barnett formula does not give actual figures but indicates percentages of the overall budget for target allocations. Treasury, Cabinet and Parliament have the right to deviate from these indications if there is a specific financial need to be addressed. Precise Welsh needs and indeed the adequacy of the Barnett formula itself are regularly re-assessed as part of the government’s comprehensive spending reviews which take place every two to three years on average. The latest one of these was held in June 2002.  
	On the other hand, it is the NAW’s own responsibility to decide how to spend the funds allocated in this way by Westminster, known as the ‘block grant’, which in the financial year 2001-2002​[8]​ consisted of £ 8.758bn (see Table 2). About two thirds of these funds were more or less ring-fenced for certain tasks, in particular the two largest sections, local government and education. In other areas, the NAW, on the initiative of the Welsh Executive, enjoys a considerable freedom of manoeuvre in terms of allocating finances to particular sectors and tasks. 

Table 2. NAW Budget 2001-02, by Expenditure Type

Expenditure Type 	Budget allocation (£ m)	Budget allocation (%)
Agriculture, Forestry,  Rural Areas	230	2.6
Culture, Sport, Welsh Language	57	0.7
Economic Development 	412	4.7
Education	930	10.6
Environment, Planning and Transport	295	3.4
Health and Social Services 	3,243	37.0
Housing 	575	6.6
Local Government	2,866	32.7
NAW Running Costs 	25	0.3
Welsh Civil Service 	125	1.4
Total	8,758	100
source: NAW Commissioning Paper for the 2001 Budget Planning Round, Cardiff: NAW, 2001, p. 2.


Table 3. NAW Budget 2001-02, by spending institutions

Spending Institutions	Budget allocation (£ m)	Budget allocation (%)
NAW (directly) 	1,192	13.6
National Health Service (NHS) Trusts	3,099	35.4
Local Authorities 	3,538	40.4
Welsh Semi-Public Agencies 	929	10.6
Total	8,758	100
 source: NAW Commissioning Paper for the 2001 Budget Planning Round, Cardiff: NAW 2001, p. 3.


Key areas of  managerial responsibility of the NAW

Managing  semi-public agencies is a new role for the NAW, not previously undertaken by the Welsh Office. A key devolution development was the merger of the three largest semi-public agencies in Wales, the Welsh Development Agency (WDA), the Development Board for Rural Wales (DBRW) and the Land Authority for Wales, into a new, enlarged WDA. This move was welcomed by devolutionists as a crucial step of asserting the NAW’s authority over public spending in Wales. However, it was not an NAW decision. The merger had been discussed in the Labour Party since 1996, and was finally implemented by the UK government (not the NAW) in September 1999 – only then did the NAW receive the full power to alter or abolish Welsh agencies. The rationale behind this decision was to prevent a further development of the already emerging planning competition between these agencies due to overlapping briefs and an apparent lack of adequate co-operation procedures. 
At the moment, semi-public agencies, account for 46% of the overall public expenditure in Wales (see Table 3), of which the lion’s share (35.4 % of the overall expenditure, some £ 3,099m in 2001-02) is earmarked for NHS Trusts. These funds are rigidly ring-fenced by the UK Treasury, and the NAW’s influence is limited to some control over the territorial appropriation and selection of specific services to be developed, but in both cases having to take into account performance indicators and targets set out by the UK government. Semi-public agencies sponsored by the Assembly, including the new-style WDA, received £ 929m in 2001-02, just under 11% of the overall public expenditure. The NAW has no direct say in the day-to-day use of these funds by the agencies concerned.  However, the NAW does have the right and the duty to audit the performance of the agencies. Unsatisfactory performance can be acted upon by the NAW in a variety of ways, from changing the following year’s allocations to personnel change requests and – ultimately – structural reforms which alter or abolish the agencies concerned. So far, the NAW has not made use of the latter power, but fund shifting and personnel changes (in the WDA) have been requested in the 2000 audit round.             
Expenditures by Local Government account for just over 40% of the NAW budget (see Table 3). The money is ring-fenced for local authorities to meet their statutory obligations, but not specifically designated for individual authorities or tasks. The main distribution of these funds is based on population size. However, Westminster’s Local Government Act 2000 gives the Secretary of State for Wales the right to “amend, repeal or revoke an enactment [by the NAW] that he believes prevents or obstructs local authorities from promoting the well-being of their areas” (Lang, 2001:138). This is a classic example of primary Westminster legislation superseding any – or any potential – secondary NAW legislation. There is an additional aspect to local government funding. Similar in the mechanics of calculating entitlements and responsibilities to the German Länderfinanzausgleich (equalisation payments between regions), the richest Welsh local authorities, at present nine of the 22, receive a smaller share of NAW local government grants than they would be entitled to according to their population figures. The poorest local authorities, four at the moment, receive a larger share. This is supposed to be compensation for the poorer areas’ limited abilities to raise Council Tax and Local Business Tax, or so the proponents of the scheme, Plaid Cymru-dominated councils in West Wales and the Valleys, claimed. As these debates took place before the introduction of the coalition government in October 2000,​[9]​ the First Secretary of the NAW, Rhodri Morgan AM, agreed to the scheme, which was regarded by many in the Labour Party as an attempt to “buy” Plaid’s support for his ERDF Objective 1 funding distribution plans, which cover roughly the same area.​[10]​  
Direct NAW Expenditures comprise funds that are not designated by the UK Treasury for any particular purpose and are not spent on supporting the Welsh semi-public agencies. In 2001-02, these funds accounted for a mere 13.6% of the Welsh budget. A main item of expenditure included in direct expenditure is Central Administration, including Welsh civil service salaries and capital expenditure on NAW properties, totalling £ 125m. Culture, Sport and the Welsh Language, together, received only £ 57m in 2001-02 – less than 1% of the NAW’s budget, which has been the cause for serious concern both among language activists and culture and sports organisations. However, the costs of providing teaching in these subjects are part of the Education budget, including the teaching of Welsh under the provisions of the Welsh Language in Education Act, 1991. 
The largest direct expenditure item, however, is Economic Development. Out of the overall allocation of just over £ 465m in 2001-02, just over half was spent by the NAW directly, mainly in the form of matched funding for the Objective 1 projects, while roughly the other half found its way to the WDA and other agencies tasked with regional development management. The utilisation of these funds will be considered in more detail below. 

Regional economic development management and the use of European Structural Funds

In the days before devolution, the Welsh Office, the Secretary of State for Wales, and also the UK Department of Trade and Industry were the government’s primary instruments of political steering concerning economic development in Wales. Since 1999, the vast majority of functions associated with economic development have been transferred to the NAW and its associated offices. The Welsh Office bureaucracy has become the Welsh Civil Service, and the NAW’s First Secretary and Economic Development Secretary, along with the NAW’s Economic Development Committee, have taken over the Secretary of State’s roles in economic development management – and enjoy a far greater political and financial freedom of manoeuvre than any Secretary of State for Wales ever had. There are seven major types of Expenditure on Economic Development.​[11]​
Regional Selective Assistance and other Business Support. UK domestic funding for economic development is still available, in the form of Regional Selective Assistance and associated measures such as Exchange Risk Guarantees and various Development and Enterprise Grants which, though significantly modified on several occasions, have survived from the 1960s when the then Prime Minister Harold Wilson was trying to create his ‘level playing field’ throughout the UK economy. These means of support are available in all parts of Wales, regardless of any EU eligibility criteria. From their peak of £ 101.3m in 1988-89 (Welsh Office, 1994), they came down to as little as £ 55.775m in 2001-02, but according to the NAW’s 2001 budget proposals are set to rise again up to £ 71.0m by 2003-04 – a level last seen in 1992-93.  
	Information and Communication Technology Advice Infrastructure. For quite some time now there have been considerable concerns among the Welsh business community, in particular in the SME sector, regarding access to modern information and communication technologies. So far, these concerns have been addressed predominantly on a local level, with local authorities, semi-public agencies, and business organisations providing the relevant support services. Some EU funds were earmarked for this purpose too, in particular within the STRIDE programme in North Wales. However, funds for a number of these measures have already run out at the end of the last EU funding period (1999), or are going to run out in 2006. The NAW plans to step into this gap with new funds of £ 8.5m starting in the financial year 2002-03 and rising to £ 10m p.a. in the following financial years. 
	Pathway to Prosperity Fund. This fund is supposed to be dedicated to supporting the development of sustainable structures in the Welsh business landscape. It contains the NAW’s direct funding for business initiatives, and a vast proportion of this money (65.5% in 2001-02 rising to 86.4% by 2005-06) is earmarked for direct NAW Matched Funding for EU co-financed projects in West Wales and the Valleys. However, as more and more of these projects are to be handled by the WDA, the overall size of this fund is set to decline while the WDA budget is going to be increased accordingly. The transfer of the role of making decisions on these projects to the WDA was politically motivated. When the first round of projects was approved by the NAW in Spring 2000, political pressure by Plaid Cymru to ensure maximum funding in areas run by Plaid-controlled local authorities resulted in the acceptance of a number of projects which cannot strictly be described as business development: projects set up by the voluntary sector to improve social services received funding from this source although it was quite clear that they would stand virtually no chance of becoming self-sustained by the end of the support period. Business organisations were not impressed by this decision, and CBI Wales used this as an argument in their claim that the business community should have a greater say in the planning and funding allocation decision-making process.​[12]​ The WDA, seen as less prone to direct political pressures than the NAW, was therefore better placed to take the lead in managing these processes.     
	WDA funding. The WDA is to retain its role spearheading economic development throughout Wales, through its triple task of business support activities, asset management and place marketing. Business support activities are by far the largest of these tasks, eating up almost 80% of the WDA budget. However, it has to be noted that the WDA also receives some funds from a number of these activities, ranging from fees for services and training courses to holding shares in new companies for a certain period of time. These receipts are then put into other activities and are not supposed to be regarded as profit. It is difficult to ascertain at the moment exactly how much of the WDA’s business support funds will be used on matched funding for EU funds, although it is likely to be over 50% until 2006-07. The key factor here will be how much matched funding can be raised from the private sector. Given the current economic climate, and the rather less positive experience with Private Finance Initiative projects in England recently, the sums that can be raised in this way are likely to be smaller than one would have hoped for. A second factor of uncertainty is introduced by the chance that the UK government might provide extra funds for special projects, e.g.  which are seen to be in the UK’s interest as a whole, and for projects which cross the English border. Despite a never-ending stream of demands by Plaid Cymru for additional UK government funds, both in the NAW and in Westminster, so far the UK Treasury has been very reluctant to go down that route. The 2002 comprehensive spending review has confirmed this policy, focussing on health, education, transport and fighting crime (Hardy, 2002), rather than regional development. Until 2005, additional money in that field is likely to be spent only on establishing English regions. 
Cardiff Bay Development. The development of the Cardiff Bay area remains a special case. In order to bypass local resistance which threatened to undermine normal planning procedures in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Conservative government decided to push through the development plans by a special Act of Parliament. The projects were to be conducted by the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation, created for this purpose and funded by the government through the Welsh Office. With most actual development tasks now completed, the Corporation has been dismantled and the day-to-day management of the bay area has passed to Cardiff County Council. However, because of the peculiarity of using parliamentary legislation in order to run an individual development project, the financial responsibility for its maintenance remains with the UK government. The funds, approximately £ 16m p.a., are channelled from the UK Treasury to Cardiff County Council via the NAW, but the NAW has no say in this despite the fact that its own building is located is in the area.    
Welsh Tourist Board (WTB). Tourism is one of the key industries in Wales. However, the very nature of tourism routinely puts it somewhat at odds with other economic development tasks. This is the reason why the WTB was not merged into the WDA despite the fact that its main tasks – business support, asset management, and place marketing – are very similar to the WDA’s role. Out of a total allocation of just over £ 20m in 2001-02, rising to just under £ 22m p.a. by 2003-04, current expenditure for business support activities takes the lion’s share, with just under £ 14m in 2001-02, rising to just over £ 16m by 2003-04. Much of this money will find its way to West Wales as matching funds for EU co-financed projects, as tourism is one of the priorities in the Objective 1 area planning documentation. 




Table 4. NAW Economic Development Budget Plans 2001-05 (1000 £)

Task 	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05 
Regional Selective Assistance and Other Business Support (a)	58,775	65,053	71,028	71,028
Information and Communication Technology Advice Infrastructure 	0	8,500	10,000	10,000
Pathway to Prosperity Fund (b) 	29,143	24,293	22,064	22,064
WDA (c) 	192,999	198,104	202,127	202,127
Cardiff Bay Development (d) 	18,019	16,019	15,819	15,819
Wales Tourist Board 	20,386	20,536	21,890	21,890
Other Economic Development Measures 	1,663	1,880	1,675	1,675




European Structural Funds Programme Support	718	542	779	779
FIFG	800	1,300	1,470	1,470
EAGGF	8,100	1,200	12,400	12,400
Total EU Funding 	135,239	170,263	182,700	182,700
				
Grand Total NAW + EU Spending on Economic Development in Wales	456,221	504,648	527,303	527,303

(a) comprising Regional Selective Assistance, Exchange Risk Guarantees, Regional Development Grants, and Regional Enterprise Grants.
(b) Includes on average  £ 19m Matched Funding for projects co-financed by the EU.
(c) From 2002-03 includes £ 1.8m rising to just under £ 1.9m Matched Funding under the WDA Structural Funds Partnership. 
(d) Funds to be transferred to Cardiff County Council which has taken over the former Cardiff Bay Development Corporation. 





Having investigated the available funds for Welsh regional development, we now turn to the question of developing the appropriate policy contents on which to spend these funds. Until very recently, strategic economic development planning has been a very difficult and controversial task in Wales. The disagreements between the business community and the NAW over the nature of measures to be taken also transpired into the NAW’s own deliberations, both in the plenary and in the Economic Development Committee. There were two distinct party-political angles to it: Labour’s internal disagreements, and the confrontation between Plaid Cymru and Labour. Many of these debates are documented in detail elsewhere (e.g., Storer, 2001). Assembly members constantly were faced with analyses from the Civil Service about Wales’ serious economic problems. Furthermore, having promised too many things to too many people in the devolution referendum campaign, devolutionists had raised public expectations to an astonishingly unrealistic level. Therefore, in its first two years of operating, the new NAW came under intense pressure to come up with coherent plans for the future of economic and social development in Wales. A first attempt, the National Economic Development Strategy (NEDS), published in 2000, fared little better than the Objective 1 Planning Documents. Both were essentially exercises in compromise. While this is not unusual in politics, compromises are only as good as the aims that can be achieved by making them, and the NEDS was found wanting by too many members of the Welsh polity, from businesses to voluntary sector organisations and politicians. 
The Labour-Liberal coalition which came to power in October 2000 vowed to do better. After all, both parties share a more business-like approach to economic policy-making, which is more than could be said for Plaid Cymru, whose nationalist rhetoric more often than not gets in the way of sound calculating. The removal of the need to secure Plaid’s agreement in the NAW for proposed actions stabilised the policy-making role of the Executive and increased its freedom of manoeuvre considerably. 
In the referendum campaign, all three pro-devolution parties stressed that a NAW would be run openly and transparently, and would be willing to engage in policy learning from whatever best practice examples could be found within Europe in order to overcome the handicap of institutional inexperience. With regard to economic development planning, the Executive apparently did not feel any need to look further than England – or Whitehall, to be precise. In November 2001, the Executive provided a new planning paper, A Wining Wales, designed to serve as a general economic development strategy until 2010. Reading the text, one can hardly escape the conclusion that this paper was based on similar Regional Planning Guidance (RPG) documents which the English regions had to produce at that time under the Planning Guidance Note No. 11 (PPG 11), issued by the then UK Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions in October 2000 after six months of consultation with actors involved in planning in the English regions (Elcock, 2001). Wales, obviously, was not consulted, as the Guidance Note was not supposed to be applicable there. However, the Welsh Executive saw following the PPG 11 approach as one way to ensure Westminster’s and Downing Street’s support for the Welsh strategy. Thus, A Wining Wales follows PPG 11 guidelines very closely indeed. First, the document provides us with a Vision Statement for Wales, followed by an analysis of the state of the Welsh economy, and then proceeds to present ten Strategic Aims, each underpinned by a set of specific targets and measures to be taken by the NAW and other public bodies​[13]​ to achieve these.   
The Vision Statement reads: “To achieve a prosperous Welsh economy that is dynamic, inclusive and sustainable, based on competitive businesses with skilled, well-motivated people.” (NAW, 2001:7). By and large, this vision statement sets a fairly realistic tone. It avoids hardly achievable boasts such as “The East Midlands will be the most progressive region in Europe...” (Elcock, 2001:9), while still conveying a sense of purpose that is hard to argue against in any way. Nevertheless, in the Economic Analysis section it becomes quite clear that the vision outlined above poses a considerable challenge. The need for economic restructuring requires a constant job creation effort, as the job losses in the traditional industries (about 200,000 in the last 30 years; NAW 2001:9) are often replaced with not very secure employment in volatile sectors such as retail services and call centres. However, the Executive sees Wales’ considerable dependency on links with customers and investors from outside Wales as an opportunity rather than a problem, in particular because such links have already created benefits for some English regions. Wales, however, has yet to see sustainable tangible benefits on a larger scale. In terms of GDP per head, Wales has fallen further behind the UK average, from 84% in 1989 to 81% in 1999. Other regions which faced similar restructuring problems, such as the North East and the West Midlands, have managed to maintain their GDP/head position of about 90% of the UK average, while only Yorkshire & Humberside has seen a worse decline than Wales in that period, from 84% to 77% (NAW 2001:11). However, the Executive denies that this was due to a lower level of productivity in Wales as Welsh productivity levels remained close to the UK average. This analysis leads to a definition of the ten Strategic Aims and subsequent specific targets and measures. In addition, the document announces a forthcoming National Spatial Planning Framework to facilitate the economic development strategy, which has subsequently been published in March 2000. All targets are to be fulfilled by the end of the 10-year period (March 2010).
Supporting Businesses. Welsh GDP per head should rise to 90% of the UK average by 2010, with the ultimate aim of achieving parity with the UK average, and some 135,000 jobs should be created, using as much ERDF funds as possible for businesses who are prepared to create jobs in Wales. The new jobs target certainly sounds ambitious, and making such specific statements may come back to haunt the Executive. Remarkably, this section does not contain any statement about job retention – clearly a decision based on previous Welsh experiences about the futility of this idea. Nevertheless, this de-values the jobs target. Using European funds to maximum effect should in theory go without saying, but given the difficult experience with Plaid’s demands for ERDF spending on social measures, it can be seen as an attempt by the Executive to take a more businesslike, long-term approach to sustainable development. 
Encouraging Innovation. Here, the target is to increase Research and Development (R&D) expenditure by businesses to more than 1% of Welsh GDP, from currently just under 0.6%, mainly through expanding the use of the EU’s existing SMART scheme, by  boosting the number of ‘incubator facilities’ across Wales for innovative businesses, and by establishing a regional manufacturing centre of excellence. All these points are certainly difficult to disagree with, but very much run-of-the-mill compared to most British and other regions throughout the EU. 
Concerning Encouraging Entrepreneurship, the NAW envisages to raise the number of Welsh businesses to achieve the UK average level of VAT-registered businesses per 10,000 people, not least through providing help for SME start-ups in the form of a new Small Loan Fund. The number of businesses per population is a very crude measurement of entrepreneurship, but in Wales so far both the business creation rate and the business failure rate are clearly worse than the UK average (NAW, 2001:34). Work is therefore needed on both ends. The focus on SME to develop indigenous businesses seems natural, but typically in Wales SME means employee numbers of just over 10 rather than just under 500. 
	In the energy and environment sectors, the aim is simply Setting A Fresh Direction, meaning that 10% of energy production should come from clean sources, using Wales’ natural wind and water resources. However, the name of this aim is clearly misleading. The proposed measures are not setting any new direction but just help to continue a trend that has been present in the Welsh energy sector since the end of the coal era in the late 1980s. After the removal of the UK Government’s temporary ban on gas-fired power stations, two of these are now going ahead in West Wales and one has been completed in January 2001 near Bristol and serving South Wales. Also, there is not going to be a major resurrection of coal in Wales: the possible resurrection of coal had been a motivating factor behind the temporary ban on gas-fired power stations, but the government admitted in the summer of 2000 that this policy has failed, and to extend the ban would have left the UK with a potential energy crisis. On the other hand, large-scale field trials of wind energy in the hills of Central and along the West Wales coast had moved out of research into production as early as the mid-1990s. 
	On trade matters, the Executive wishes Wales to be bold: Establishing Wales In The World. This translates into the targets of at least matching the UK export growth rate and attempting to ensure that private spending by tourists in Wales is going to increase by an average of 6% per year. Proposed measures include the development of an international trade strategy, offering better packages for attracting inward investment, and attracting tourists by providing special offers, including hosting major sports and cultural events. While the title of the aim is a return to the bad old days of hype with little substance, the aim clearly ties in with the rest of the economic development strategy. Routine place marketing is to continue, with, again, a strong emphasis on tourism. The NAW clearly wishes to off-load the responsibilities here to the WDA and the WTB, which in turn will receive somewhat greater funding (see above).    
The relatively low skills base of the Welsh workforce necessitates a further development if the employment and business creation schemes mentioned above are to be achieved: Making Wales A Learning Country. The aims here are to reduce the proportion of adults of working age without any qualifications from 25% in 1996 to 10%, and to increase the proportion of adults of working age with a National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) Level 4​[14]​  from 20% in 1996 to over 30%. This aim is certainly very welcome news in the former coal mining valleys, where areas with extremely high unemployment coincide with areas of low or inadequate skills within the workforce. To organise this education drive, a new semi-public agency with a very broad role in  vocational training has been created, Education and Learning in Wales (ELWa). However, one should note the political trick used by the NAW of measuring success not against the present situation but against the 1996 figures – the last full year of Conservative government.  
At any rate, deprived areas of Wales need extra support, with the aim of Creating Strong Communities. According to the Executive, the target should be that household disposable income increases to 95% of UK average, through the development of a poverty-combating programme with particular emphasis on social inclusion, and through sub-regional regeneration plans. The economics behind this idea are debatable: the disposable household income should to rise to 95% of the UK average, while the GDP per head is to rise to only 90% of the UK average. So far, the gap is filled by spending ERDF money on subsidising local services in poor areas – thus indirectly increasing the disposable income there – but what about 2007 onwards, when the ERDF and ESF funds will have run out? This aim must be regarded as political rather than economic in nature. The real reason behind it is the inroads Plaid has made into the traditional Labour and Liberal strongholds in the poorer areas of Wales. With Plaid, churning out social demands at every opportunity and promising to deliver them as soon as they get the chance, Labour has to come up with a response in the second legislative period of the NAW.   
The aim of Improving Transport was outlined in March 2001 in the Transport Framework for Wales (NAW, 2001c), section 3.1.3.: to develop a better co-ordinated and sustainable transport system to support local communities and the creation of a prosperous economy, through better maintenance and improvement of roads in all areas, the further development of the major ports and Cardiff Airport, and rail network upgrading, contributing to the UK government’s target of moving 80% of all freight by rail. Major road infrastructure projects have been completed in both North and South Wales in the 1990s. So it is appropriate that this aim looks somewhat conservative. However, there are still no plans for a direct rail link between North and South Wales.
Supporting Rural Wales also must be regarded as a major issue, as over 75% of the Welsh territory must be regarded as rural (Carter and Griffiths, 1987). The targets for this aim were published in March 2001 in the Rural Development Plan for Wales 2000-2006  (NAW, 2001d), section 6.1.4.: a sustainable society – a population with a balanced age structure which recognises and nurtures indigenous cultures, living in thriving communities with access to public services which meet local needs and where people participate in the process of making decisions about their own future – and a sustainable economy which provides prosperity for all rural communities through increased economic activity, more employment opportunities, and higher incomes. These aims, though still without concrete figures attached, are to a large extent an admission of past failures. Labour’s relations with rural communities have been strained to breaking point on several occasions in the past, and it was not by chance that Agriculture Secretary Christine Gwyther was the first member of the first Welsh Executive to lose her job. Developments since, not least the foot-and-mouth disease in 2001, have still been difficult. The Coalition did realise that they had to take the rural agenda seriously. 
Finally, the Executive also identified the need for Promoting Information And Communication Technologies. The target here is to increase the proportion of Welsh businesses using e-commerce to the UK average as measured by the DTI ‘Connectivity Index’ Of the UK department of trade and Industry (DTI). So far, the NAW itself has certainly managed to set a splendid example, from internet access at each seat in the plenary chamber to making documents publicly available on the internet. But for all these initiatives, the crucial point will be how to make e-commerce financially viable for the businesses. The sector has seen a huge down-turn after its hyped-up launch less than five years ago, now the emphasis has to be on a more sustainable approach. Help and advice by the public sector is certainly welcome, but the internet is beyond anyone’s control, and there are limits to what the NAW can do. After all, the retention of qualified personnel can only be achieved if the proper jobs are available. Call Centres are not a high-tech business.     	
	       
Conclusions
In Wales, the core element of devolution is the power to make decisions on a regional economic development strategy. On the formal side, Welsh political actors have certainly got most of what they wanted, even though the financial dependence on Westminster and Whitehall is still obvious. Implementing the new institutional framework, Wales has initially run into a root problem of regional mobilisation: though ostensibly purely a meritocratic process, it is – in Gary Marks’ terms – the resource ‘access  to authoritative decision-making’  which decides whether a particular project is approved or rejected. A side effect of this is that projects backed by that resource need not be particularly viable in order to be approved. One indicator for this is the project’s self-sufficiency in the long run, an area where Wales has encountered a number of severe problems. The decision to use much of the current Objective 1 funds on projects which are not likely to become self-sufficient prolongs this problem and is a highly questionable use of the funds. After all, the funds are designed to initiate a process of sustainable development, not as plugs for holes in a region’s budget.  
In the end, the success of Wales’ economic development strategy largely depends on the appropriateness of the development activities. While widespread consultations within the communities concerned are valuable, the ultimate criterion of success for co-operation activities is actually to get things done. Critics, such as the Conservatives, argue that the most important incentive for both local actors and the business community is to obtain cash from Europe. It is true that many EU grants depend on the existence of  regional networks capable of implementing the envisaged projects, and delivering the desired results. It is also true that the mobilisation activities only make sense if in the end they become relatively self-sufficient in financial terms and generate benefits for those involved. But access to grants cannot and should not be the only rationale for setting up projects. A learning process is required on both the public and the private side if co-operation is to be established. Public actors need to understand that if they want private actors to get involved and put up private money for public projects, businesses actually need to have a say in planning and decision-making procedures. The same goes for feasible bids for EU funds. On the other hand, the business community needs to understand more clearly that public national and EU funds are not a cow to be milked to death for private gain – otherwise public actors will rightfully remain unwilling to let private actors in on decision-making processes. Business leaders, just as politicians, need to realise that obtaining grants ought not to be an end in itself. High eligibility is not something to celebrate but an indication of previous failure to succeed.    
The Labour-Liberal Welsh Executive pledged to make use of Welsh private actors’ willingness to become more closely involved in all aspects of the regional development process. Motivated – among other things – by the wish to provide room for more inclusive consultation, co-operation and decision-making, the changes that are now being implemented go beyond a change  in business practices. The key element of the changes is the central role of the NAW. Whether these new arrangements will stand the test of time will depend on how fast a new culture of enhanced co-operation among all actors in the field of economic development can be implemented, and how efficient the new arrangements, dependent as they are on the goodwill of these actors, are going to work. We are now in a key period in that respect, until 2006: probably for the last time, significant amounts of EU money are available to large parts of Wales.
The new strategic approach as set out in the A Winning Wales planning document offers a chance to remedy this situation. Finally the Welsh Executive has come out into the open with a long-term strategy that goes beyond the hastily compiled stop-gap approach adopted in producing the Objective 1 application documents and the initial National Economic Development Strategy in 1999-2000. Of particular importance during the second legislative period, which has just begun in May 2003, will be whether the NAW is really going to be able to provide the sort of leadership set out in this new economic development strategy: setting clearly defined targets but not proscribing marching orders, encouraging but not interfering in implementation strategies, facilitating but not steering projects with too heavy a hand.  While this is cause for optimism with regard to the policy style to be adopted by the NAW, one has to bear in mind that economic development will remain a major task in Wales for decades rather than years: A Winning Wales does contain only a single target – at least matching the UK export growth rate – in which the NAW aims to ensure that Wales should perform better than the UK average. 
The 2003 elections have provided Labour with a wafer-thin absolute majority in the NAW. First Secretary Morgan and his team now have a free hand in shaping Wales’ development policies. If Labour keeps its promise to continue the trends set since October 2000, it is likely that the Liberals will lend a hand of support if and when required. Plaid Cymru’s nationalists, on the other hand, with their concept of socio-cultural ‘self government of Wales’, effectively to be paid for by accepting long-term economic under-development, have suffered a massive electoral set-back. The Conservatives gained some points by staunchly supporting the views of the business community, as per usual – which, by the way, frees the party from creating alternative development concepts of their own. In the long run, though, openness and inclusivity in the decision-making processes and implementations strategies are going to be the decisive factors in Wales’ regional mobilisation efforts.  
External representation of Wales’ interests within the overall political system of the UK is of crucial importance, not least because of Wales’ dependency on London in terms of framework legislation and financial provisions. While the Concordat agreements, created shortly after the establishment of the NAW, provide a framework for all concerned, the present arrangements fall short of legal guarantees. Until recently, the full-time Secretary of State was the focal point through whom both the NAW and the UK government could channel the practical issues. This arrangement worked reasonably satisfactorily, not lease because Labour was in office in both London and Cardiff. The new arrangements, with a Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, and a part-time Secretary of State for Wales, leave a lot of practical questions unanswered as yet, especially in terms of formal rights and responsibilities. A key test may come – possibly only several years from now – when different political parties are in power in London and Cardiff. Yet even now a formalisation of the current arrangements, possibly in an Amendment to the Government of Wales Act, 1998, would be most welcome in order to clarify key issues of responsibilities and procedures in the interaction between the Welsh and the UK systems.     

	The Welsh devolution case is certainly not unique. With regard to practical political management and policy-making processes, there is always Scotland as the bigger Celtic brother to look up to. Across Europe, we already see an increasing keenness among regions to learn from best practice elsewhere. Welsh political actors are very much part of this trend, and are quite proactive in terms of policy learning, not least through Wales’ involvement in the “Four Motors” Initiative,​[15]​ as an associate member. Further partnerships exist with Irish and Dutch regions and local authorities. However, in most of these partnerships, Wales cases must be regarded as the “junior partner”, eager to learn but as yet with little to contribute. 
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^1	  The SP, on the other hand, does have some primary legislative powers where it can act without reference to Westminster legislation. In addition, the SP enjoys the power to vary tax levels in Scotland (up to +/- 3% of the UK level), but has not used this power to date (July 2003). The NAW does not have tax altering powers. 
^2	  The NAW electoral system is a mixed one in which 40 members are elected in 40 single-member constituencies, and 20 members are elected from sub-regional Party Lists. The percentages given in Table 1 refer to these party list votes and therefore do not translate directly into the overall allocation of seats. 
^3	  Exceptions: Defence (Ministry of Defence), the justice system (Lord Chancellor’s epartment), overseeing local government (Department of Environment), overseeing semi-public agencies (Department of Trade and Industry), customs (Treasury Department) and state pensions (Department of Work and Pensions).
^4	  After the introduction of Regional Development Agencies, the formation of unelected Regional Assemblies (consisting of from Local Councils) and the compulsory creation of Regional Development Plans by these institutions for all English Standard Regions, the next step is going to be the introduction of elected Regional Assemblies if the population in these regions wishes to do this. As was the case in Scotland and Wales, regional referenda are going to take place from 2004 on to decide this question. Three North English regions are goint to be the test cases for this, with referenda scheduled for June 2004.   
^5	  The Northern Ireland, however, remains a separate Department, with a full-time Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in the Cabinet.
^6	  The Leader of the House of Commons is the leader of the government’s party group within the House of Commons. The Leader is usually also a member of the Cabinet. However, the Leader of the House of Commons  should not be mistaken for the Speaker of the House of Commons, who is the senior representative of the whole House, chairs the sessions, and is supposed to behave in a party-politically neutral way. The Speaker is not a member of the government, this role is purely parliamentary.
^7	  Government of Wales Act, 1998
^8	  The UK financial year runs from 6 April to 5 April of the following year.
^9	  According to the 1999 NAW elections result (see Table 1), there was no clear party-political majority in the NAW. A Labour minority government was tolerated by both Plaid Cymru and the Liberals, with majorities needed to pass legislation being negotiated on a case-by-case basis. As this system appeared to break down in the Autumn of 2000, Labour and the Liberals entered into a formal coalition in order to re-gain political stability.
^10	  Interview, Cardiff City Council, Sept. 2000. 
^11	  For planned figures see Table 4.
^12	  Interview, Confederation of British Industry (CBI) Wales, 2000.
^13	  The text specifically mentions the WDA, the education quango Education and Learning in Wales (ELWa), the WTB and any other “sponsored bodies” (i.e. being subject to the NAW’s overseeing function and receiving NAW funding). The document also states that it “must be reflected by UK Government Department and Agencies operating in Wales such as the Employment Service and the Department of Work and Pensions” (NAW 2001:7), but the NAW has no power to enforce this.  
^14	  NVQs are the industrial equivalent to academic degrees, ranging from 1 (semi-skilled worker) to 5 (equivalent to University degree). NVQ 4 is the equivalent to having completed a degree programme at a Polytechnic or College of Further Education. 
^15	  Comprising Baden-Württemberg, Lombardy, Rhône-Alpes, and Catalonia.
^16	  Typical examples here in would be the West German politicians and administration personnel recruited after German unification for the task of establishing the institutional landscape in the new Eastern Länder. 
